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ABSTRACT 
This paper attends to treat the question about the “following a rule” in the philosophy of 
the second Wittgenstein and to connect it with the relation between pragmatics and seman-
tic. In the philosophical Investigations this argument (§§ 185-142) represents the culmina-
tion of the attempt to elucidate the concepts of use, meaning and understanding, which are 
introduced in the previous paragraphs. I mean to show that the rule, designed like a sign 
which indicates how take an action, is an inscrutable fact if we don’t insert it in a precise 
context of human practices and behaviour. This inscrutability of the rule and of the sign 
raises an apparent contradiction: the rules make possible our lived but they have not sense 
if considered alone. Such dependence of the rules on the practices is mutual because it’s im-
possible thinking a practice without a rule. The connection rule-practice, that is treated 
similarly as the relation meaning-use, permit us to introduce the follow arguments my paper 
will consider: holism of the rule and of the meanings, the question about the understanding 
and the recognizing of rules and meanings, finally the question about the agreement in the 
actions. 
 
 
1. Following a rule: methodological premise 
 
The question concerning following a rule as it is introduced in the Philosophical 
Investigations (PI, §§185-242)1 can be considered the lintel that joins together 
and sustains both the previous argumentations about the linguistic games and 
also the subsequent ones, which introduce the concept of agreement and the 
critique of the private language. This problem is also debated in the Remarks 
                                                 
1 Ludwig, Wittgenstein (1953) Philosophical Investigations [Philosophische Untersuchungen], 
edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford. 
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on the foundations of Mathematics (RFM)2 and in The Brown and Blue Books 
(BB).3 To understand well the second phase of Wittgenstein’s thought, it is 
opportune and methodologically correct to remember that it derives from his 
critique of his previous philosophy, which considered language as a calculus. 
His earlier theory of language implies that there cannot be an arbitrary use of 
signs and such use cannot be considered to conform to a rule. In the second 
phase of his thought, in contrast, he assumes that rules cannot determine the 
application and procedures, deducing that the calculus theory is absurd be-
cause the uses and the behaviours are arbitrary. This implied a new approach 
to mathematics, which is recognized as an institution that is ontologically 
grounded on self-referential concepts. 
In the Philosophical Investigations the question concerning following a rule 
is introduced as the problem of understanding signs and the symbolic world in 
which we live (PI, §§130-185). He thus shows the internal relation between the 
subject and the verbal, graphical and non graphical signs, in order to make 
clear what happens in the mind as we see a symbol or as we think about a rule. 
For Wittgenstein the man is a symbolic being because he has a preferential 
relation with signs; I define this relation preferential because each of us, in re-
gard to the symbolic world, takes up the active role of learning, elaborating 
and possibly modifying. Symbols and rules are treated by the individual as 
something inherited, which Wittgenstein often treats as a Grammar, some-
times as a Mythology of the use (PI, § 221)4, other times as an agreement in the 
forms of life (PI, § 241)5, but never as the agreement in thoughts and opinions. 
In fact, he avoids separating the rules from their application because he 
does not want to treat them as a Platonic Universe that can legitimate experi-
ence (Erlebnis) and actions. They are not even the result of a discursive rela-
tion between individuals as Scorekeepings and commitive practices in general, 
through which an agreement about opinions and behaviours is produced. 
                                                 
2 Ludwig, Wittgenstein (1956) Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics [Bemerkungen über 
die Grundlagen der Mathematik], edited by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. An-
scombe, Oxford. 
3 Ludwig, Wittgenstein (1958) The Blue and Brown Books, edited by R. Rhees, Oxford. 
4 PI, § 221: “My symbolical expression was really a mythological description of the use of a 
rule”. 
5 PI, § 241: “ “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is 
false?” – It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language 
their use. that is not agreement in opinions but in form of life”. 
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In order to emphasize the importance of the experience, Wittgenstein does 
not distinguish the symbol from its author and from its interpreters, and he 
does not separate the rules from the practice. Therefore the rule is not separa-
ble from the act of following it because the act of following it is not different 
from the process of understanding. 
Let us consider PI, § 185: a pupil must carry out a numerical succession by 
adding 2 to the preceding number; from 1000 he begins to add 4, because he 
believes that every time he reaches 1000 he must add an additional 2 . So the 
succession becomes the following: up to 1000 add +2, from 1000-2000 add 
+2+2, from 2000-3000 add +2+2+2, and so on endlessly. The pupil produces a 
new rule that differs from the rule given by the master. How can he do it? 
Why did he follow one rule up to 1000 and afterwards follow a new rule? It 
could be as I, driving my car, decide to stop a red lights while in Milan, at yel-
low lights while in Florence and at green lights while in Rome. The solution for 
this paradox is that the rule is not the anticipation of future events because we 
should not conceive it as a metaphysical fact or a demon, which can lead and 
advise my actions. Wittgenstein intends to demythicize the concept of rule in 
order to focus on the forms of life and on the internal relation each of us has 
with rules and with language in general. This shows that the rule is deeply 
rooted in the experience and also in the misunderstandings and the interpreta-
tions; the concept of a rule indicates a regularity in the acting but never an an-
ticipation of the act. 
This ideal of regularity does not determine the experience (Erlebnis) or the 
choices because the rule can be contradicted by a new or an unusual behaviour. 
But one has not to see this anomaly as a behaviour without rules, for each ac-
tion has a rule and a rule cannot be performed only once by only one individ-
ual (PI, § 199).6 Moreover, no course of action can be determined by a single 
rule, since every action has a precise rule (PI, § 201).7 There is no action with-
out regularity, but at the same time an action can break a norm. Beginning 
                                                 
6 PI, § 199: “It is no possible that there should have been only one occasion on which some-
one obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which 
a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on. – To obey a rule, to make a re-
port, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).” 
7 PI, § 201: “ This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, be-
cause every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if 
everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict 
with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here”. 
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from these remarks we are led to admit that there is not a direct relation be-
tween an action and the rule comparable to the relation between an effect and 
the cause. For this reason Wittgenstein’s conception of following a rule is com-
pared to Hume’s scepticism about the concept of cause. One is not master of 
this relation, which remains however fundamental to understanding mental 
processes, intentionality and practices in general. 
Therefore the individual has a preferential relation with the rule and with 
the symbolic world in general, for he is a symbolic being that can modify the 
rules without thinking that the rules are the ground of the behaviour (§ 211).8 
Wittgenstein offers a good example in his analysis of the pieces of chess: each 
piece would be a simple piece of wood without the rules, which determine the 
use; the rules give a special value to each piece and they define their use. But 
what are the rules without the chess game? 
Another good suggestion is offered in PI, § 212 and all the passages in which 
Wittgenstein introduces the connection between rule and order. This connec-
tion permits us to understand the conditioning exerted by the rules on us, who, 
following an order-rule, cannot be diverted by the problem about the legiti-
macy of that order-rule. 
We can observe the rules only in relation to the whole of the linguistic 
games, the other rules and the practice in general. This inscrutability of the 
rules, which form the range of our experience, our intentions and our actions, 
bring us to an apparent contradiction: they make possible our experience but 
they make no sense when considered alone. They give meaning to that without 
which they could not exist.  
This inscrutability is the result of a precise strategy of Wittgenstein: he 
does not intend to consider the rules that justify the action but instead to re-
duce them to a whole of codes, which represent an endless regularity. Like the 
rules of a numerical succession, they indicate an endless possibility of reply, 
but at the same time they are a mere representation of what can happen in the 
practices and they can be contested and renewed, similar to the case of the pu-
pil who after 1000 begins to add +4 and not +2. The rules should represent a 
whole of paradigms, which serve to show a regularity of a form of life or of be-
haviour, but they cannot determine it. They have the nominal function of de-
                                                 
8 PI, § 211: “ How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself – whatever in-
struction you give him? – Well, how do I know? — If that means “have I reasons?” the an-
swer is: my reason will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reason”. 
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scribing the practices stated and transmitted by a specific tradition: the tradi-
tion of playing chess, the history of mathematics, in other words, a mythologi-
cal description of the use (PI, § 221). 
But we must also consider that every person has a specific relationship with 
the rules and with the symbolic universe; they become familiar, similar to the 
countenances of our memory that we conserve because they are part of our 
cultural and historical property. 
This apparent contradiction led some authors to interpret Wittgenstein as a 
relativist or even a sceptic, who showed simply the possibility to found the act-
ing only on the institutions, on the uses and on the customs. Probably these 
authors did not consider the strange and ambiguous connection between rule 
and practice that Wittgenstein wants to describe in these passages. They are 
persuaded that Wittgenstein intends to solve the problem concerning our rela-
tion with institutions simply through the elaboration of the concept of agree-
ment in the forms of life (PI, § 241). 
In contrast to this reading, I believe that Wittgenstein wants to treat rules 
like a mere description of a practice we can abandon or change in each mo-
ment; he understands that men do not learn through the rules but through the 
relation with other individuals and with the language, which define the way 
we get to know the world around us. Recent research in evolutionary anthro-
pology gives support to this reading (Tommasello, 1999).9 According to Tom-
masello, children learn symbols, words and behaviours in a pragmatic context 
through their relation with adults, who already have familiarity with practices 
and life. 
Therefore, I find that Wittgenstein, in these famous passages of the Investi-
gations, does not aim merely to show that the only anchorage for rules is the 
agreement, for otherwise following a rule would be a source of paradoxes and 
ambiguity. Instead, the agreement of the forms of life depends on the marginal 
character of the rules to act or play in a linguistic context. They are the ideal 
portrayal of the endless repetitiveness of an act one can make in another way. 
Let us now consider our symbolic universe and picture ourselves lost in an 
unknown forest. After roving a long time we see an indicator that points in a 
precise direction. What have we to do? Should we follow the indicator? Should 
                                                 
9 Michael, Tommasello (1999) The Cultural Origins of the Human Cognition, Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 
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we ignore it? Should we go in the opposite direction? Should we sit down and 
wait to see who placed the signal? 
Consider a second example. We see a picture that, when turned horizon-
tally, represents the head of a duck and, when turned vertically, represents the 
head of a hare. And so we ask: “what does the author of this picture want to 
represent?” 
Are these cases proof of an irreducible relativism of signs and norms? 
I do not believe it is. In fact, in the first case one cannot reconstruct the 
value of the signal, for one does not know who placed it and what he wanted to 
indicate; in the second case we have an ambiguity of the portrayal, which re-
sults in an alteration in the interpretation, but not a form of relativism in the 
perception. 
Both examples permit us to observe a situation in which the rule is unclear 
because the context itself is unclear, which prevents us from putting together 
again the structure in which that symbol has been situated. Here Wittgenstein 
propose to look behind every rule and behind our symbolic world in order 
firstly to see there the forms of life and to overcome the anxiety caused by the 
relation the subject-procedure or single act-general act, which is a source of 
ambiguity. For these reasons I suggest that Wittgenstein treats the rule as an 
inscrutable fact, because it is hardly visible by our actions. It hides in the 
shadow, attempting to fix the action through a rule and permitting me to do it 
endlessly again. 
Two things emerge from this methodological premise: 1)the rule is the ideal 
portrayal of what can be replicated endlessly, 2) we can overcome the anxiety 
of the relation between subject and procedure by admitting that the rule is an 
inscrutable fact that underlies the interpersonal context of the forms of life. 
Now I intend to clarify why the rule is an inscrutable fact. 
 
 
2. The rule as the natural trend to create a tradition 
 
Wittgenstein writes in PI, § 154: “But wait – if ‘Now I understand the princi-
ple’ does not mean the same as ‘The formula … occurs to me’ (or ‘I say the 
formula’, ‘I write down’, etc.) – does it follow from this that I employ the sen-
tence ‘Now I understand …’ or ‘Now I can go on’ as a description of a process 
occurring behind or side by side with that of saying the formula? If there has 
to be anything ‘behind the utterance of the formula’ it is particular circum-
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stances, which justify me in saying I can go on – when the formula occurs to 
me. Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all. – For that is 
the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in 
what kind of circumstances, do we say, ‘Now I can know how to go on’ … un-
derstanding is not a mental process.” 
Why does Wittgenstein in this and other passages raise the question about 
how one can go on alone without the aid of someone? This happens when the 
pupil takes possession of the practice and can really go on alone, without the 
advice of the teacher. But this does not mean that it happened as internal 
processes (in the German version: seelischer Vorgang). More simply, the pupil is 
now master of a particular technique in doing something. Here the rule that 
the teacher used to clarify how to do the task is replaced by the pupil in a mas-
tery of technique. The rule is again inscrutable. It is the representation of what 
I have to do, but as soon as I can do what the rule expresses, I do not need it. 
The idea of a rule and the question of following a rule arises when we dis-
tinguish the subject from the procedure, or – to use a word typical in contem-
porary pragmatism – the subject from the performance. Our thought can rec-
ognize the regularity in the linguistic games and describe formally this regular-
ity with what we call a rule. Wittgenstein criticizes this splitting-phenomena – 
which arises in separating the uses from the rules – and in the passages PI, §§ 
241-242, which are the last ones about this theme, he applies the concept of 
agreement (in German Übereinstimmung) to hook again the rules to the prac-
tices. 
But this does not indicate an absolute dislike for the division of the rule 
from the act; the rule hook-up itself becomes like a shadow that watches over 
the operation of the subject, for it is natural for the individual to find an ideal 
form for a successful action. 
I give an example: Robinson Crusoe is wrecked on a desert island and finds 
a good method for bringing drinkable water from a river to his shack on the 
seashore. It is a system of bamboo cane pipes that work very well, on condition 
that he checks regularly the efficiency and changes the ruined pipes with new 
and well-carved pieces. He must remember the rules, which permit him to in-
stall and to overhaul his little and rudimentary aqueduct as soon as it is neces-
sary. R. Crusoe cannot share these rules with anyone except himself, as long as 
he remains on his desert island. 
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Like each of us, he could separate the rule from the procedure in order to 
better remember it10 and eventually teach someone and to hand it on to future 
inhabitants of that island. But as he constructed the aqueduct, he remembered 
the rule only for himself, for he could not forecast that Friday had to arrive 
and that he had to come back to his country. 
Through this example it is clear that the concept of agreement, which is in-
troduced at the end of the reasoning about following a rule, is inadequate for 
understanding how one follows a rule. I think the concept of agreement is in-
troduced in the Philosophical Investigations by virtue of their flowing style. 
However, this is ultimately inappropriate for understanding the ambiguity, 
which is connected to the problem of following a rule. 
I think it is more reasonable to consider that the rule is useless while I am 
acting, because while I am acting I am not following a rule but instead adapt-
ing myself to a form of life I can potentially share with an infinite number of 
subjects, including myself in the past or in the future. The rule is a sign, a 
scheme that remains after I perform something. But for whom does it remain? 
It remains for my successor, for my follower and for all who intend to share in 
the future that form of life. For this reason I believe that the rule is the natural 
tendency of the individual to create a tradition and a culture that are to be 
conserved, spread and handed on. 
In RFM, VP3 Wittgenstein writes that the rule “stands as it were alone in 
its glory; although what gives it importance is the facts of daily experience. 
What I have to do is as it were to describe the office of a king;P in doing which 
I must never fall into the error of explaining the kingly dignity by the king’s 
usefulness, but I must leave neither his usefulness nor in his dignity out of ac-
count. I am guided in practical work by the result of transforming an expres-
sion. But in that case how can I still say that it means the same thing whether 
I say “here are 625 nuts”, or “here are 25 × 25 nuts”? If you verify the propo-
sition “here are 625 …” then in doing that you are also verifying “here are 25 
× 25 …”; etc. But the one form is closer to one kind of verification, the other 
closer to another”.11 
                                                 
10 That’s what Wittgenstein says in PI, § 199 when he writes: “It is no possible that there 
should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that 
there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or 
understood; and so on. – To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game 
of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).” 
11 L, Wittgenstein (1956). 
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With this metaphor we touch on many important aspects of the idea of a 
rule that Wittgenstein treats in his writings. The rule, when considered alone, 
is the monument of its self-glory, but only carrying it out in practice can give 
it importance. The rule is the monument of the use that is the affirmation of 
its dignity and majesty, but like all monuments it can become obsolete and 
forgotten. 
We can gain insight into the relation between rule and use by comparing it 
with the relation between tradition and innovation. In a known aphorism, 
Wittgenstein compared the language to an ancient city with old portions and 
modern portions, that is, to something that can conciliate old and new (PI, § 
18). Through the rule a practice can be handed down, but through a practice a 
rule can be brought into question, improved and also neglected. The cohabita-
tion between practice and rule is never peaceful because the individual has an 
active and dialectic relationship with the rules. They receive sense and value 
by the use and not vice versa, and such a legitimating makes them deeply 
rooted in our customs, our culture and our tradition, giving them the character 
of inscrutability. 
This inscrutable and intransitive nature of rules is twofold: from one side 
their rigidity gives continuity and coherence to a specific behaviour, from the 
other side this inscrutability makes them partially foreign to the experience. 
Each of us, by acting and following a rule, remains in the perspective of the 
uses and the customs in which that rule is rooted. In other words, the individ-
ual relates himself to a practice that is based on an interpersonal relation and 
on a historical stratification of behaviours and principles. 
These behaviours are grounded in a tradition and the form of this tradition 
is the rule, which, as a solitary and vacuous monument of a practice, presides 
over its self-continuity and length. 
 
 
3. The arbitrary nature of the rule 
 
Wittgenstein writes in PI, § 219: “All the steps are really already taken” 
means: I no longer have any choice. The rule, once stamped with a particular 
meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole of 
space. – But if something of this sort really were the case, how would it help? 
No; my description only made sense if it was to be understood symbolically. – 
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I should have said: This is how it strikes me. When I obey a rule, I do not 
choose. I obey the rule blindly.” 
This passage may be understood in light of the question about the intransi-
tive character that signs and rules assume. But, as we have already indicated, 
we cannot treat rules as a railway track because I can break them and this im-
plies that I am following a second rule. This ambivalence of the rule – that it 
can be at the same time rigorous and questionable – depends on the fact that 
the rule is an integral part of the action and can be definite like an “actor’s 
category”.12 In other words, we cannot compare the rule to the description of 
behaviour of a spectator or to the result of a theory, which has a preferential 
point of view in comparison with social behaviours. Wittgenstein rejected the 
possibility of making the philosophy of language out of language itself by set-
ting up a super- language with superconcepts (PI, § 97).13 This leads him to 
formulate the idea of family likeness (PI, § 108), which permits him to deprive 
logic of the task of unifying and disciplining the linguistic phenomena. 
This assigns behaviours an arbitrary character and following a rule a per-
formative one, in which rule and action stick together, setting up a form of 
immanence between rule and performance, depriving the author of a critical 
perspective of both what he is doing (PI, § 219)14 and what others are doing 
(PI, §§ 185-188). 
The only way to understand the impossibility of giving a description to the 
process of following a rule is to accept the arbitrary character and self- refer-
ring nature of practices, which have like reference only the interpersonal con-
text in which they are developed. 
                                                 
12 Bloor, D. (1997) Wittgenstein. Rules and Institutions, Routledge, London and New York. 
13 PI, § 97: “We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential, in our in-
vestigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. That is, the 
order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, proof, truth, experience, and so 
on. This is order is a super-order between - so to speak - super-concepts. Whereas, of course, 
if the 
words “language”, “experience”, “world”, have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of 
the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”“. 
14 PI, § 219: “ “All the steps are really already taken” means: I no longer have any choice. 
The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be 
followed through the whole of space. — But if something of this sort really were the case, 
how would it help? No; my description only made sense if it was to be understood symboli-
cally. — I should have said: This is how it strikes me. When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I 
obey the rule blindly. 
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To better explain this point we can resort to a simple example: Dr. Jones is 
the owner of a home with a view over the sea, a garage and a garden with a 
barbecue. The furnishings are not particularly sumptuous but they are practi-
cal and comfortable. 
I could continue to describe at length the home of Dr. Jones, illustrating 
without difficulty all the things present in that home. But what should I an-
swer if someone would ask me: “Could you give me a better sense of the ex-
pression “to be an owner”?”. 
The concept of property belongs to a specific use, which in theory cannot be 
adopted by other societies different from the society of Dr. Jones. To introduce 
my interlocutor to the concept of private property, I must clarify for him the 
sense of property so that he may be familiar with the use of this concept typi-
cal in our societies. He would then be educated in a social practice, which for 
Wittgenstein means to know a rule (PI, § 150),15 or to know how to go on alone 
(PI, §§ 151-152).16 
The agreement about the rules is a conventional fact and as we speak about 
Dr. Jones as an owner of a home, we are not talking about a physical object. 
Rather, we refer to a convention. At the same time, our agreement about the 
rules assumes an intransitive character, similar to the way we talk about an 
object, of which we can have empirical experience. The regularity expressed by 
the rules is the result of the fact that we relate ourselves to rules in the same 
way we relate ourselves to a self- referential and self- founded system. The rea-
sons for this are that they are the product of society, which is an interpersonal 
structure that plays a key role in the constitution of our semantic and behav-
ioural world, which tends to be transmitted and to become stratified. The ri-
gidity of the facts is mediated by a holistic and interpersonal structure of be-
haviour, rules and values, which are the Grammar of our experience and which 
are mediated by the language. 
This Grammar is the necessary cultural ground from which our behaviour 
develops itself; the inexorability (die Unerbittlickeit) of the mathematics is an 
example. At the same time, the theorists that see in the Wittgensteinian con-
                                                 
15 PI, § 150: “The grammar of the world “knows” is evidently closely related to that of 
“can”, “is able to”. But also closely related to that of “understand”. (‘Mastery’ of a tech-
nique)”. 
16 Particularly G. Baker e P. Hacker and their volume Grammar and Necessity (1985), 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
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ception of grammar a necessary structure of transmission of truth and objec-
tivity16 clash with the fact that grammar does not produce only arithmetical 
rules that have an objective nature, but also conventions like the concept of 
property or of rights, which have no counterpart in the natural world. 
The whole of the behaviours and of the culture is formed by the model of 
the physical world and behaves like a second nature that influences us and 
characterizes us. In RFM, VP29 we read: “What sort of proposition is: “The 
class of lions is not a lion, but the class of the classes is a class”? How is it veri-
fied? How could be it used? … To draw someone’s attention to the fact that 
the word “lion” is used in a fundamentally different way from the name of a 
lion; whereas the class word “class” is used like the designation of one of the 
classes, say the class of lions. 
One can say that the word “class” is used reflexively, even if for instance 
one accepts Russell’s theory of types”.17 
Such a difference between the use of the word “lion” and the use of the 
word “class” arises because physical objects have a reference in the world while 
conventional objects are the way they are in virtue of a practical and social 
behaviour. Thus the use of these words is self- referring and can be verified 
only by recognizing their conventional and not empirical character. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In the second phase of his thought Wittgenstein abandoned the conception of 
language as a calculus and adopted instead a conception of language as behav-
iour. In doing so he had to address the fact that natural languages are more 
complex than formal language. 
Moreover, in this phase, the language appeared to him as something articu-
lated and difficult to analyze. Consider this passage, PI § 203: “Language is a 
labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; 
you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way 
about.”  
This passage indicates that for the second Wittgenstein it was impossible to 
bring back language under a general rule, under which it would be possible to 
derive all utterances. On the contrary, he adopted an analysis of the uses that 
                                                 
17 L., Wittgenstein (1956). 
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reveals the pragmatic component in the meaning. This also occurs when we 
analyze the question about following a rule; it is possible to learn a rule in a 
pragmatic and interpersonal context and breaking it is a pragmatic and inter-
personal fact. 
The fact that behind every action lies a rule should not lead us to assume 
erroneously that to break a rule requires a rule. The rule, as we argued, is what 
remains of a practice; it is the sign behind which there is the experience (Erleb-
nis) of its author or the experience that a linguistic community decided to 
adopt as a form of life. In these passages of the Investigations, Wittgenstein 
suggests that we have not to separate the sign and the rule from the interper-
sonal context in which it is adopted. 
This is the reason I picked the word “inscrutability”; in fact, the rule is 
barely visible behind the behaviours. The real protagonists of the Investiga-
tions are experience (Erlebnis), intersubjectivity and forms of life, and not the 
sign that is deprived of its formal character, which cannot be identified with 
the action. But I do not use inscrutable only in the sense of invisible, but also 
to indicate the intransitive and implicit character of the rule. The rule, as a 
portrayal of a behaviour, is also the tool to transmit the forms of life and the 
whole of the rules is the inheritance and the cultural influence that is our iden-
tity. Such influence is the sense of belonging to a group, of sharing the forms of 
life and it is also the possibility of learning a language. For this Wittgenstein 
tends to see in the rule an intransitive fact and to deny that its interpretation 
could determine the meaning. In fact, we read in PI, § 198: ““But how can a 
rule show me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some inter-
pretation, in accord with a rule”. – That is not what we ought to say, but 
rather: any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, 
and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not deter-
mine meaning.”  
There is an ambiguity in the question of following a rule: one can break it 
but only by following a second rule, but if one follows the first rule, one can 
not also interpret it; instead one must follow it as one is trained (abgerichtet). 
Such ambiguity is solved if we consider the fact that rules must be connected 
to the practices and to the forms of life, which stay in an interpersonal context. 
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If I break a rule, I am acting, but since the word rule is related to the word 
agreement through the concept of use (PI, § 224)18 and since the use of the con-
cept of rule is based on the concept of same (PI, § 225)19 and the concepts of 
regularity and repetition, it is clear that in breaking a rule I also adopt a rule, 
for every action has an interpersonal aspect that emerges through the rules. 
Breaking a rule becomes clear to our selves and to others if it is described with 
a rule that permits me, as we have seen, to fix a behaviour. From this point we 
can derive the interpersonal and self-referring character of actions, thoughts 
and forms of life. 
Nonetheless, Wittgenstein does not want to give space to the interpreta-
tions of the rules, for following a rule does not mean interpreting it. Even here 
the interpersonal character of the rule comes into play; in fact, if I say “I’m 
following a rule”, the rule is not subject to my personal and private interpreta-
tions since it was transmitted to me in an interpersonal and linguistic way. 
To conclude, breaking a rule is inscrutable because it is foreign to my ex-
perience (Erlebnis), to my personality and to the reasons that moved me to 
break it. It shows all its vacuity in comparison to the experience and to the 
ability I have to renew and to remove the old paradigms. But in following the 
rule, the rule is still inscrutable, for my action is not determined by my person-
ality, but by the personality of that shared form of live I am assuming and 
personifying. My choices are always orientated to the forms of life and to the 
agreement; in fact, in following the rule I also have to respect the sense of that 
form of life, of which the rule is the expression. In breaking the rule I must al-
ways keep in mind the experience and the dimension of the agreement, then I 
will describe my breaking through a rule and I could hand it by making a new 
rule. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 PI, § 224: “The word “agreement” and the word “rule” are related to one another, they 
are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with 
it.” 
19 PI, § 225: “The use of the word ‘rule’ and the use of the word ‘same’ are interwoven. (As 
are the use of ‘proposition’ and the use of ‘true’.)” 
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